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ABSTRACT 
Evidence that humans play a dominant role in most ecosystems forces scientists to confront              
systems that contain factors transgressing traditional disciplinary boundaries. However, it is an            
open question whether this state of affairs should encourage interdisciplinary exchange or            
integration. With two case studies, we show that exchange between ecologists and economists             
is preferable, for epistemological and policy-oriented reasons, to their acting independently.           
We call this “exchange gain.” Our case studies show that theoretical exchanges can be less               
disruptive to current theory than commonly thought—valuable exchange does not necessarily           
require disciplinary integration. 
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 1. Introduction 
The growing Anthropocene consensus, that humans are a major geological and           
environmental force on par with natural forces, has proven to be a hotbed for discussion               
beyond the science of geology (Steffen et al. 2007; Thomas 2014; Bonneuil and Fressoz 2015;               
Corlett 2015; Purdy 2015). One reason is that it forces scholars to confront problems and               
systems that contain factors transgressing traditional disciplinary boundaries. This is          
especially so for the sciences of ecology and economics: economics has by and large explicitly               
ignored the “natural” environment, while ecology has largely focused on it exclusively            
(O’Neill and Kahn 2000; Dasgupta 2010; Martin et al. 2012; Inkpen forthcoming-a). One             
consequence of the Anthropocene consensus is that the distinction between human and natural             
systems is no longer firm: human-natural coupled systems are not exceptions, they are quickly              
becoming the new norm (Pickett et al. 2005; Liu et al. 2007a, 2007b). Economics and ecology,                
deliberately separated in the nineteenth-century on the basis of different research objects and             
objectives, are now rethinking their separation, as evidenced by transdisciplinary research           
programs such as “ecological economics”.  1
There is a growing body of literature in philosophy of science examining            
interdisciplinarity. This literature traces back to Lindley Darden and Nancy Maull’s classic            
paper about “interfield theories,” but has recently accelerated at a quickening pace, perhaps as              
a result of the increasing interdisciplinary nature of contemporary science itself (Darden and             
Maull 1977; see the recent edited volumes by Brigandt 2013, Grüne-Yanoff and Morgan 2013,              
Grüne-Yanoff and Mӓki 2014). This literature has focused on a broad range of issues,              
including: traditional philosophical problems, such as reductionism and incommensurability         
(Mitchell 2003, Longino 2013); the conceptual, methodological and theoretical entities that           
are exchanged between disciplines (Rice and Smart 2011); the types of exchanges that occur              
between disciplines (Grüne-Yanoff and Mӓki 2014); whether interdisciplinary exchange has          
been productive or detrimental (Plutynski 2013; Love and Lugar 2013; Mӓki 2013); and the              
reasons for interdisciplinary integration and exchange, whether ontological, methodological,         
or epistemological (Mitchell 2009; Brigandt 2013).  
Despite growing in scope, this literature has so far ignored one of the primary drivers               
of interdisciplinary science today: the Anthropocene consensus (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2015).           
1 Ecological Economics is a policy-oriented school of thought that emerged as a formal institution in the late                  
1980s, with its origins extending back to Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen’s ​The Entropy Law and Economic              
Processes ​ (1971) (Costanza 1989; Christensen 1989; Røpke 2005; Martinez-Alier and Røpke 2008).  
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 What are the implications, if any, for interdisciplinary exchange between ecology and            
economics that arise from a world that contains a mixture of anthropogenic and             
non-anthropogenic factors?  
We argue, first, that the collapse of the distinction between natural processes and             
societal processes inherent in the Anthropocene consensus has signaled the causal           
entanglement of the objects traditionally studied by ecologists and economists. We claim that             
this can be construed as the breakdown of a disciplinary idealization: that ecology is to ignore                
anthropogenic factors and economics, in general, is to ignore the non-anthropogenic factors.            
Focusing on two case studies—one demonstrating ecology’s need of economics, and the other             
showing economics’ need of ecology—we argue that excluding anthropogenic factors from           
ecological models and non-anthropogenic factors from economic models lessens their          
predictive success. This mutual dependence rests on the fact that the target systems for both               
disciplines include anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic factors and, as we will show,           
excluding one set of factors is not an innocuous idealization. Finally, we argue that              
disciplinary interactions should be scientifically informed, that is, based on evidence of greater             
predictive success or explanatory power, rather than on reasons of disciplinary identity or             
purity, as has been the case in the past.  
This paper engages with the recent literature on interdisciplinarity in the philosophy of             
science in three ways. First, this literature has focused on enumerating the conditions             
underwriting the possibility and success of interdisciplinary exchange. We ask the following            2
question: what makes interdisciplinarity necessary or worth advancing? We argue that the            
recognition that so-called human-natural coupled systems are the new norm should encourage            
exchanges between ecology and economics: in the cases provided below, exchange between            
these disciplines is epistemologically preferable to their acting independently. We call this            
exchange gain​ . Second, as Grüne-Yanoff and Mäki (2014, 58) suggest, this literature would             
benefit from studies of how disciplines can undergo successful exchanges without requiring            
2 A note about terminology. In the interdisciplinarity literature, interdisciplinary exchange, transfer,            
collaboration, and integration have separate and specific meanings. An exchange occurs if objects,             
broadly construed, employed in one discipline are used to solve problems of another discipline. A               
transfer occurs when agents from only one discipline pursue an exchange. A collaboration occurs when               
agents from both disciplines jointly pursue an exchange. Disciplinary integration occurs when an             
exchange forces some significant breakdown of disciplinary boundaries. In the most extreme case,             
integration involves the complete breakdown of boundaries. 
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 disciplinary integration. The two cases below demonstrate that theoretical exchanges can be            
less disruptive to current theory than might be expected—disciplinary exchange brings           
epistemological advantages without requiring disciplinary integration. Third, in accordance         
with this literature’s aim to provide a comprehensive taxonomy of interdisciplinary exchange            
types, we provide two new types: ​non-disruptive model-variable transfer and ​non-disruptive           
model-system transfer​ . 
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the Anthropocene and its            
implications for interdisciplinary research. It also lays out our argument explicitly. Section 3             
summarizes our contribution to the recent literature about interdisciplinarity. Sections 4 and 5             
provide case studies of interdisciplinary exchanges between ecology and economics,          
respectively. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Interdisciplinary Exchange in the Age of Humans 
Imagine a world in which ecology and economics get on quite well without one              
another. This is a world that is made up of relatively independent human and natural systems:                
one set of systems, the object of ecology, consists of non-anthropogenic or “natural” factors;              
another set, the object of economics, consist of anthropogenic or human factors. In such a tidy                
world, these sciences, when operating effectively, make successful predictions and prescribe           
policy interventions without the need for interdisciplinary exchange.  
Throughout much of the twentieth-century this imaginary world seems to have been            
implicitly assumed. As ecologist Robert O’Neill and economist James Kahn wrote in 2000: 
 
the current paradigm in ecology considers humans not as a keystone species [a dominant              
species on which other species within an ecosystem depend] but as an external             
disturbance on the “natural” ecosystem. [...] The problem with this approach is that             
human beings are, in fact, another biotic species within the ecosystem and not an              
external influence. 
But the artificial isolation of humans from their ecosystem is not due only to the               
ecologists’ paradigm. In the economic paradigm as well, human society, with all of its              
self-organization and self-regulatory activity, is represented as a separate “system.” The           
ecosystem is viewed as external to society, providing goods and services, unoccupied            
territory in which to expand, and assimilative capacity to handle by-products. [...] The             
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 ecological paradigm isolates human activity in a box labeled “disturbances.” The           
economic paradigm, in turn, isolates ecosystem dynamics in a box labeled           
“externalities.” (O’Neill and Kahn 2000, 333) 
 
Of course, this imaginary world is just that, a fiction. The real world is messy. Strictly                
speaking, there is no longer any part of the earth’s surface that remains completely detached               
from human technologies (McKibben 1990; Bensaude-Vincent and Newman 2007; Wapner          
2010; Vogel 2015). By the late 1990s, it was estimated that up to one-half of the earth’s land                  
surface was transformed by human action (Vitousek ​et al. 1997). Today, roughly 75% of              
ice-free land on earth has been transformed by agriculture and human settlement changing             
ecosystem patterns and processes across most of the terrestrial biosphere (Ellis and            
Ramankutty 2008; Martin et al​ . 2012; Ellis ​et al​ . 2013). Human presence is so pervasive on                 
earth that some argue it marks a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene (Steffen ​et al​ . 2011).               
The world today is a blend of anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic factors and prima facie               3
this seems like a world in which exchange between ecology and economics would be a               
prerequisite to successful science.  
Recent discussions in the philosophy of science about idealization can help illuminate            
this state of affairs (Weisberg 2007). Invariably, theorizing involves intentional distortions           4
and simplifications, and theoreticians must make decisions about which factors to include in             
their models and which to ignore. These decisions can be made for pragmatic reasons, for               
example, to simplify a model so that it is computationally or cognitively tractable (referred to               
as ​Galilean Idealizations​ ). They are also made because ignoring some factors is believed to be               
causally innocuous (​Minimalist Idealization​ ). The relevant concerns for any idealization are           
(i) whether the factor that was omitted from, or distorted in, the model would substantially               
change the predictions or explanatory power of the model if it had been taken into account,                
and (ii) if the predictions or explanatory power are substantially changed, what we should do               
3 The term “Anthropocene” was coined by Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen in year 2000 to describe the                 
current geological epoch that is characterized by the enormous role that human activity has for               
geological and ecological phenomena (Jones 2011). 
4 Following Jones (2005) it has been common to draw a distinction between ​idealization​ and               
abstraction​ , the former being the assertion of a falsehood, the latter being merely an omission. In this                 
paper, I follow Weisberg’s (2007) pluralist account and treat abstraction as a form of minimalist               
idealization, as I explain below. 
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 about the idealization. Practitioners making Galilean idealizations would justify the omission           
of such factors on grounds of tractability; those making minimalist idealizations could not             
justify such omissions.  
We argue that there are cases in which ignoring economic factors leads to poor              
predictions in ecology and cases when ignoring ecological factors leads to poor policy             
prescriptions in economics. For all such cases, if we presume that the goal is to obtain                
successful predictions and, ultimately, recommend successful policy interventions​ , then both          
types of idealizations are unwarranted. In other words, if the best predictions and prescriptions              
for policy intervention require hybrid economic-ecological models containing anthropogenic         
and non-anthropogenic causal factors, then such factors should not be omitted merely on             
grounds of idealization. 
The main argument of this paper can be summarized as follows. The world is now               
made of systems containing interdependent anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic factors, but          
ecology has tended to idealize anthropogenic factors and economics has tended to idealize             
non-anthropogenic factors. Although idealizations in general can be justified pragmatically or           
because they are innocuous, our claim is that not every idealization in ecology and economics               
can be so justified. We question whether the idealizations in ecology and economics are              
justified pragmatically given, first, that model exchange can in some cases be quite             
non-disruptive and thus ​not a computational or cognitive burden, and, second, that our best              
chance of providing successful predictions, and also successful policy interventions, is model            
exchange. Furthermore, we claim that, in the past, what justified these idealizations was often              
neither pragmatics nor innocuousness, but instead “disciplinary purity.” Reasons of          
disciplinary purity should never trump epistemic reasons, such as greater explanatory potential            
or predictive success and, thus, this reason is unwarranted as well. We conclude that the recent                
evidence, which suggests that many of the world's systems contain interdependent           
anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic factors, is a new and independent reason for promoting            
and fostering interdisciplinary exchange. 
 
3. Interdisciplinarity and the Philosophy of Science 
In recent years, philosophers of science have shown a growing interest in inter- and               
transdisciplinarity science (Gibbons ​et al. 1994; Brigandt 2013; Longino 2013; Love and            
Lugar 2013; Grüne-Yanoff and Mäki 2014; Macleod and Nagatsu 2016). Many acknowledge            
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 that collaborations between researchers working in different disciplines is a requirement for            
addressing the complex environmental, societal and medical problems that we face, and so             
frameworks that help us to understand when and why such collaborations will be productive              
are essential. This literature has focused on a number of questions, including: What social,              
institutional, and organizational factors hinder interdisciplinary exchange? What factors         
promote exchange? How do different disciplines coordinate and modify their existing           
conceptual frameworks and methods? How do they come to terms with different epistemic and              
explanatory standards?  
This paper contributes to this literature in a novel way by focusing on specific cases               
that makes interdisciplinary science imperative. We argue that recognizing that human-natural           
coupled systems are the new norm should encourage exchanges between ecology and            
economics, exchanges that have traditionally been discouraged by disciplinary boundaries.          
One standard worry is that interdisciplinary exchange requires an unrealistic or burdensome            
level of integration between two disciplines. However, the case studies we provide below             
demonstrate that this is not always the case. Significant epistemological advantages can be             
purchased, in some cases, relatively cheaply, without requiring disciplinary integration and           
with minimal collaboration. 
The following case studies also speak to some of the more traditional questions about              
interdisciplinarity. For example, the specific epistemic virtues generated by interdisciplinary          
exchange between ecologists and economists. MacLeod and Nagatsu (2016) follow a similar            
line of reasoning when they argue that successful interdisciplinary collaboration provides           
practitioners with “collaborative gains,” such as better predictive power or explanatory scope.            
Because our case studies of interdisciplinary exchange involve little bidirectional collaboration           
compared to that of MacLeod and Nagatsu (2016), we will call these epistemological and              
policy-oriented advantages “exchange gain.”  
Before providing the details of these case studies, we would like to fit the types of                
interdisciplinary exchange we present—​non-disruptive model-variable transfer and       
non-disruptive model-system transfer​ —into the helpful taxonomy that was originally         
developed by Grüne-Yanoff and Mäki (2014, 55). These authors summarize the general            
characteristics of interdisciplinary exchange as follows: “Let there be two disciplines, A and             
B, with the respective (i) A-agents and B-agents, (ii) A-objects and B-objects, and (iii)              
A-problems and B-problems. Different combinations yield 13 distinct cases (allowing for an            
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 outside object X in case 13)” (Grüne-Yanoff and Mäki 2014, 55). These cases, plus one of our                 
own (14*), can be summarized in the following table (Table 1; modified from Grüne-Yanoff              
and Mäki 2014, 55): 
 
Table 1​: Possible interdisciplinary exchanges in a two-discipline environment 
 
who uses? what objects? what problem? 
1. within-discipline A A A 
2. exportation A A B 
3. importation A B A 
4. move A B B 
5. move B A A 
6. importation B A B 
7. exportation B B A 
8. within-discipline B B B 
9. personal collaboration A&B A A 
10. transfer collaboration A&B A B 
11. genuine collaboration A&B A&B A 
12. new field generation A&B A&B A&B 
13. parallel development A/B X A/B 
14.* interfield importation B A&B B 
 
Our first case study (Section 4) provides an example of (3), what is called ​interdisciplinary               
transfer by importation​ : A-agents use B-objects to address an A-problem (where “A” is             
ecology and “B” is economics). But to get at the precise details of interdisciplinary exchange,               
and to make the point that some exchanges are less disruptive to current discipline-specific              
theory than others, we further characterize this example as (i) ​non-disruptive and (ii)             
model-variable transfer (i.e., the transfer involves simply substituting an economic variable           
for an ecological variable, rather than an entire model). Our second case study (Section 5)               
provides an example of (14), what we are calling ​interfield importation​ : B-agents use models              
that combine A&B-objects to address B-problems (again, “A” is ecology, “B” is economics).             
As in our first case study, we further characterize this example as (i) ​non-disruptive and (ii)                
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 model-system transfer (i.e., the transfer involves connecting a traditional economic system to            
an ecological system with feedback links). 
Finally, our analysis provides further evidence to support the claim that successful            
interdisciplinary interaction does not always require the integration of disciplines, a thesis that             
was recently defended by Grüne-Yanoff (2016). Taking the specific cases of evolutionary            
game theory and hyperbolic discounting, Grüne-Yanoff argues that integration, to be           
understood as the growing cohesion of concepts, practices, explanations, ontologies, methods           
and data among distinct disciplines, is not a necessary condition for successful            
interdisciplinary science. With the help of our case studies, we reach the same conclusion. In               
the case of interdisciplinary exchange between ecology and economics, considerable epistemic           
gains, along with improved policy prescriptions, can be obtained without a thoroughgoing            
integration of ecology and economics. While we do not deny that there may be some cases                
that would require the complete integration of ecology and economics, our claim is that such               
an assimilation is not a necessary condition for attaining the epistemological benefits that arise              
from interdisciplinary exchange between ecology and economics. The disciplinary identities          
of these two sciences can remain, on the whole, intact. 
 
4. When Ecology Needs Economics: Island Biogeography in the Anthropocene 
Traditionally, ecologists have ignored anthropogenic factors, often discounting human         
activity as external to ecosystems and treating humans as exogenous variables or disturbing             
conditions (O’Neill and Kahn 2000; Martin et al 2012; Worm and Paine 2016; Inkpen              
forthcoming-a, forthcoming-b). Ecologist James Brown writes that the “study of humans and            
their interrelationships with the rest of the natural world has been left to the ‘social’ and the                 
‘applied’ sciences, both of which have been viewed with disdain by many of those who               
practice ‘pure’ ecology” (Brown 1995, 205).   5
As Collins ​et al.​ (2000) suggest, one reason for this treatment of anthropogenic factors              
is the assumption that human-disturbed environments are unpredictable from an ecological           
standpoint. Human actions are often governed by individual whim or social forces—whether            
5 According to Laura Martin and colleagues, “most ecologists have assumed that (seemingly)             
unpeopled environments better represent ecological and evolutionary processes and are therefore better            
objects of study” (Martin ​et al. 2012, 198). And James Collins and colleagues write that “From the                 
perspective of a field ecologist examining a natural ecosystem, people are an exogenous, perturbing              
force” (Collins ​et al​ . 2000, 416; see also Alberti ​et al​ . 2003, 1173 and Chew 2009, 148).  
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 cultural, political, or economical—that are on a different disciplinary level from what are             
thought of as ecological variables, like foraging or dispersal strategies. Without including            
anthropogenic factors, the dynamics of “human-disturbed” systems appear unpredictable. To          
predict the changing composition of species making up a human-planted forest or city park an               
ecologist must include variables which capture the intentions of forest managers or urban             
designers.  6
Acknowledging the now pervasive influence of humans on the planet, many recent            
ecologists have begun to include human activity in their models. They want an ecology that               
applies to human-disturbed as well as undisturbed landscapes, but this forces them to take into               
account economic processes. One field where this interdisciplinary exchange is occurring is            
biogeography (Thomas 2013; Mendenhall ​et al.​ 2013). The theory of island biogeography is             
particularly important because it has long been the foundation for estimating extinction rates,             
predicting changes in biodiversity, and making policy recommendations (Diamond 1975; He           
and Hubbell 2011). We present one recent example from this literature (Helmus ​et al​ . 2014). 
The theory of island biogeography explains and predicts the species richness (that is,             
number of species) that will be found on an island at equilibrium (that is, when rates of species                  
immigration to the island and species extinction on the island balance out) (MacArthur and              
Wilson 1967; Diamond 1975). In a recent paper, Helmus et al. (2014) tested the predictions of                
this theory for the distribution of ​Anolis​ lizard species among Caribbean islands. The theory              
predicts a strong negative relationship will be found between species richness and geographic             
isolation: as a result of decreased inter-island immigration, more isolated islands will contain             
fewer species than less isolated ones. It turns out that this prediction is false for Caribbean                
Anolis​ lizards because geographic isolation no longer determines immigration of new species.            
Rather, it is ​economic​ isolation that does so: islands that receive more cargo shipments are               
more likely to contain migrants from other islands, as lizards can move from island to island                
as stowaways on human cargo ships. For Caribbean lizards, that is, geographic isolation is of               
less influence on biodiversity than economic isolation. Estimating economic isolation from           
global maritime shipping-traffic data, Helmus et al. found that when economic isolation was             
substituted for geographic isolation, the new biogeographic theory fit with their data: anole             
richness was a negative function of economic isolation. They conclude that “Unlike the island              
6 See Johnson and Swan (2014) for a discussion of human landscaping preferences that might help                
build predictive urban ecology models. 
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 biogeography of the past that was determined by geographic area and isolation, in the              
Anthropocene [...] island biogeography is dominated by the economic isolation of human            
populations. [And] Just as for models of other Earth systems, biogeographic models must now              
include anthropogenic [variables] to understand, predict and mitigate the consequences of the            
new island biogeography of the Anthropocene” (Helmus et al. 2014, 543, 546). This is a clear                
case of unidirectional interdisciplinary exchange: in Grüne-Yanoff and Mäki’s terminology,          
non-disruptive interdisciplinary model-variable transfer by importation. The ​exchange gain in          
this case is predictive accuracy. 
But the case is even stronger. Building anthropogenic factors into their biogeographic            
model also gives Helmus et al. a way to predict—with the aim of mitigating—the effects of                
decreasing economic isolation. For example, as economic isolation decreases, we must           
increase our efforts to protect exotic species from the immigration of non-native species, if              
that is the conservation strategy adopted. ​Traditional theories of biogeography that do not             
include anthropogenic factors may provide few resources—or worse, may actually suggest           
inapplicable, harmful strategies—for the conservation of these Caribbean lizards because the           
variables that make a difference are not included in the model. To know whether economic               
isolation is going to increase or decrease one must follow economic trends. For example, the               
US embargo increases Cuban economic isolation, and a cessation of the embargo would             
decrease isolation and increase species richness. Helmus ​et al​ . predict that Cuba would rapidly              
gain between 1 and 2 non-native anole species, a prediction that could not be made with the                 
traditional (non-anthropogenic) biogeographic theory. 
What can we learn from this example? Not​ that ecologists should always take             
anthropogenic factors into account in ​every case. Rather, that (i) there are cases in which not                
taking anthropogenic factors into account can be epistemically disadvantageous, such as           
diminishing our ability to predict the dynamics of certain systems, and (ii) that such cases are                
not limited to urban or agricultural settings, but range over cases of “pure” ecology such as the                 
distributions of ​Anolis ​ lizards on Caribbean islands. 
Helmus ​et al.​ ’s paper demonstrates that if the goal is the successful prediction of              
ecological systems, with the hope of providing helpful advice for policy interventions, there             
are compelling reasons for encouraging interdisciplinary exchange between ecology and          
economics. This is a clear case of when ecology needs economics: not taking anthropogenic              
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 activities into consideration in the construction of a biological model diminishes our ability to              
predict the dynamics of systems to which that model ​is ​ intended to apply. 
Furthermore, connecting this discussion to that in Section 2, it is likely that as coupled               
human-natural systems, like anole distribution in the Caribbean, become the new norm,            
coupled economic-ecological models will be required. A science of ecology that leaves out             
anthropogenic factors will likely lose global relevance as the places in which its theories apply               
diminish. In other words, such an omission, whether based on a Galilean or minimal              
idealization, would be unwarranted. Rather than look at this with disappointment or scorn, a              
better response is to aim for models which ​can accommodate such systems, and this means               
championing interdisciplinary exchange. 
Exchange gain is purchased at little cost in this case. It doesn’t require the              
development of a new theoretical framework nor extensive disciplinary integration, and           
requires minimal bidirectional collaboration. Instead, what was needed was the substitution of            
a variable strongly influenced by economic trends—economic isolation—with one that is           
common in traditional ecology—geographical isolation. Here, traditional ecological theory is          
retained in a modified form. We call this type of interdisciplinary exchange ​non-disruptive             
model-variable transfer​ : an economic variable is simply substituted for an ecological one in a              
traditional ecological model. This might be contrasted with cases in which the development of              
new theory is required—cases of ​disruptive model-variable transfer​ . 
 
5. When Economics Needs Ecology: Cutthroat Trout in Yellowstone Park 
Economists have generally discounted the significance of ecological factors in their           
models and theories. They have often presumed that non-human factors are either fixed,             
exogenous, or disturbing causes. Even the most esteemed nineteenth century economic           
theorists who endorsed the Malthusian population principle downplayed the role of such            
factors in their models. David Ricardo, for instance, inaugurated this trend with his “corn              
model”, where land is depicted as an original and “indestructible factor of production” ([1817]              
1951, 67. Subsequent Ricardians, such as John Stuart Mill ([1848] 2006), not only sanctioned              7
this view of land but drove a wedge between the social and natural realms by repositioning the                 
entire core of phenomena studied by economists such that human agency is the proximate              
cause (Schabas 2005). 
7 ​See Morgan (2012, 44-81)​. 
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 Today, many economists have begun to wrestle with their Ricardian inheritance. The            
Cambridge economist, Partha Dasgupta, for example, contends that resource economists can           
no longer afford to assume that “Nature” is an “indestructible factor of production” (2010, 6).               
Others have abandoned their Ricardian legacy altogether. In fact, the entire transdisciplinary            
field of research ecological economics emphasizes the significance of including social and            
ecological factors in coupled or ecological-economic models (Costanza 1989; Christensen          
1989; Røpke 2005; van den Bergh 2001; Martinez-Alier and Røpke 2008). Be that as it may,                
ecological-economic modelling is not yet a widespread practice among mainstream resource           
economists (Wätzold ​et al.​  2006). 
According to Dasgupta, the central reason why resource economists should no longer            
assume that ecological factors are fixed is because this assumption can have harmful             
consequences if the goal is to make optimal policy prescriptions (Dasgupta ​et al.​ 2000). Simon               
Levin ​et al.​  (2013) and Kenneth Arrow ​et al. ​ (1995) concur.  
Levin ​et al. (2013) give the example of modelling coral reefs with conventional             
economic instruments, such as taxation, trading schemes, and quotas, and argue that without             
modelling such phenomena as complex adaptive systems (systems linking anthropogenic and           
non-anthropogenic factors), policy interventions are much less effective than they would be            
otherwise. Since the management of coral reefs is characterized by nonlinear feedbacks,            
strategic interactions, individual and spatial heterogeneity, and varying time scales, ignoring           
such complex characteristics lead to failures in predicting profound changes to economically            
important ecosystems. For instance, a coral reef may “flip” from having a healthy population              
of tropical fish to being an algae-dominated one and, by using a model that excludes the                
variables that determine such abrupt regime shifts, economists are incapable of predicting            
large negative economic consequences (in this case, for fisheries and tourism) associated with             
this kind of shift. Arrow ​et al. (1995) gives the example of including dynamic ecological               
factors in economic growth models. They argue that ecological factors, such as the carrying              
capacity of the environment, should be included in growth models to ensure that “the              
ecological systems on which our economies depend are resilient” (1995, 521). Their central             
worry is that modelling growth without accounting for the resilience of ecosystems could             
make societies unnecessarily sensitive to harmful external shocks. Growth models should be            
structured so that they never prescribe policies that undermine the ecological conditions that             
make human economic activity possible in the first place. 
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 Nowhere are the epistemological and policy benefits of including ecological factors in            
economic models more evident than in the case of managing invasive species in Yellowstone              
National Park, Wyoming. When Yellowstone Lake was invaded by an exotic lake trout             
(​Salvelinus namaycush​ ), managers were worried that the growth of this species would            
significantly reduce the population level of the Yellowstone cutthroat trout (​Oncorhynchus           
clarki bouvieri​ ), a native species that supports an inland fishery and a variety of non-human               
species, such as ospreys, pelicans, river otters, and grizzly bears. Chad Settle ​et al. (2002)               
specified a model for two separate systems: the economic system in Yellowstone National             
Park and the ecosystem in and around Yellowstone Lake. They asked whether their model,              
which combines details of an economic system and an ecosystem with explicit feedback links              
(economic and ecological factors are jointly determined) between them, yields significantly           
different results than a model that ignores those links. Their economic-ecological model,            
predicted that when ecosystems change, people will change their economic behavior, which in             
turn affects the ecosystem; correspondingly, any alterations in the ecosystem affects human            
economic behavior, including economic production possibilities. 
Settle ​et al.​ (2002) ran three different scenarios with their model. The best-case             
scenario is a hypothetical one, when the lake trout are costlessly eliminated from Yellowstone              
Lake. Under this optimistic scenario, the cutthroat trout would return to the lake as if the lake                 
trout had never invaded in the first place. The worse-case scenario occurs if the lake trout are                 
left to their own devices, which would have the effect of producing the smallest viable               
population of cutthroat trout. Their third policy scenario involved the National Park Service             
gillnetting the lake trout in order to reduce the risk to cutthroat trout populations. 
Their results showed that a dynamic model that integrates ecological and economic            
systems ​with feedback links between the two systems yields significantly different results than             
when one that ignores these links. In every scenario they outline, cutthroat trout populations              
differ in both magnitude and survival rates once feedback is allowed between the two systems.               
For both the best-case and policy scenarios, Settle ​et al. (2002) predicted the steady state               
population of cutthroat is lower without feedback than with feedback. Given the worst-case             
scenario, however, ignoring feedback leads to estimating a relatively high cutthroat           
population. Settle ​et al. concluded that “basing policy recommendations in Yellowstone Lake            
on data from models without feedback puts cutthroats at greater risk than would be true if                
feedback was explicitly considered” (2002, 309). In this case, the policy recommendations            
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 derived from a model without ecological factors would be worse than those derived from a               
model that connects the economic system to an ecological system with explicit feedback links. 
As with the Helmus ​et al. case in the previous section, the exchange gain in the                
cutthroat trout example can be purchased rather cheaply. The latter does not require the              
development of a completely new theory or bidirectional collaboration. Instead, Settle ​et al.​ ’s             
model merely required the addition of feedback variables that link two jointly determined             
systems. In this case, the economic variables that constitute the economic system, are not              
jettisoned or even supplanted by another variable. Rather, the traditional economic theory is             
retained, but in a supplementary form. Again, in accordance with Grüne-Yanoff and Mäki’s             
taxonomy, we can call this type of interdisciplinary exchange ​non-disruptive model-system           
transfer by interfield importation​ : an ecological system with feedback links is connected to a              
traditional economic system. This exchange contrasts sharply with types of disruptive model            
transfer involving the development of entirely new theory.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Recent scientific evidence forces scientists to acknowledge the prevalence of systems           
containing factors that transgress disciplinary boundaries. This state of affairs has           
consequences for both ecology and economics. The practitioners of these two sciences have             
traditionally found themselves occupied with phenomena on opposite sides of the           
human-natural divide. Yet, in many cases, human-natural coupled systems are the new norm.             
We have argued that there are specific cases in which these sciences fare better,              
epistemologically and in terms of policy prescriptions, when they work together to build             
models that contain anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic factors, compared to when they           
address these factors separately. In the first case, ecologists demonstrated that substituting an             
ecological variable for an economic one gave rise to a model which had a better fit with                 
current data and offered better prospects for predicting future changes in biodiversity. In the              
second case, economists maintain an economic system from their model, but connect it to a               
distinct system, an ecological system, with feedback variables that link the two systems             
together. Of course, our claim is not that ecology always needs economics, and economics              
always needs ecology. Modelling organism behavior in the trenches of the deep ocean, for              
example, may not require economics and predicting the unemployment rate will almost            
certainly not benefit from ecology. 
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 Our analysis contributes to the recent literature about interdisciplinarity in three ways.            
First, we explored what makes interdisciplinarity indispensable in some cases and argued that             
recent scientific evidence demonstrating that human-natural coupled systems are the new           
norm should itself encourage interdisciplinary exchange, and we spelled this out in terms of              
exchange gain in two different case studies. Second, we showed that exchange between             
disciplines can bring about epistemological advantages without requiring disciplinary         
integration. This conclusion is striking because many philosophers of science have supposed            
that the integration in this sense is essential to interdisciplinary science (Brigandt 2013). By              
contrast, our paper provides further evidence to support the relatively new claim that             
successful interdisciplinary interaction does not always require integration (Grüne-Yanoff         
2016). And finally, we provided two new types of interdisciplinary exchange to add to              
Grüne-Yanoff and Mäki's (2014) taxonomy. 
Our analysis also has a wider implication: although disciplinary boundaries are           
sometimes not scientifically-informed, interdisciplinary interactions should be. As with many          
sciences, disciplinary ideals (and idealizations) tend to discourage cross-disciplinary         
interaction. As in the quotation by ecologist James Brown above, interactions between            
ecologists and economists have been structured by ideas of purity: “pure” ecologists study             
non-human nature and “pure” economists often overlook non-human nature (Brown 1995).           
Yet, we have strong scientific evidence to believe that most of the terrestrial globe consists of                
coupled human-natural systems, and we have just provided evidence that such systems are             
better considered as wholes, rather than the separate objects of two independent sciences. Our              
aim has not been to argue that we should revolutionize the divisions of science, but to urge                 
that they do not always reflect evidence about our current world, and thus that the divisions                
themselves should not structure or determine interactions across disciplines. We agree with            
ecologists Boris Worm and Robert Paine that “the recognition of a novel geological epoch              
might also provide a new focus for ecology and the study of humans as a primary and                 
dominant component of contemporary ecosystems,” but we’d add that this will require            
interaction with social scientists, including economists (Worm and Paine 2016, 601). And, the             
reverse is true as well: it is to be expected that, in a growing number of cases, economics will                   
need ecology, too. Indeed, in the age of the Anthropocene, without interdisciplinary exchange             
it is to be expected that ecology and economics would relinquish global relevance because the               
distinct and separate systems to which each pure science applies will only diminish over time. 
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